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T he ethical dimension of management ownership in China 
 
Abstract: Management ownership has ethical consequences because it has an interest 
alignment effect or an entrenchment effect. In this paper we investigate the ethical 
consequences of management ownership in China using accounting conservatism as 
the direct measure of entrenchment and alignment between shareholders and 
managers. We argue and find that the ethical effect of management ownership differs 
significantly in firms with different ultimate controlling shareholders. Specifically, 
management ownership in non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) has an alignment 
effect while management ownership has less of an alignment effect in state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) than in NSOEs. These results show that the ethical consequences 
of management ownership is moderated by the nature of ultimate controlling 
ownership. 
 
K eywords: Accounting conservatism; China; Corporate ownership; Ethical 
dimension; Management ownership 
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1. Introduction 
Management ownership has ethical consequences. It has long been recognized 
that increasing management ownership helps align the interests of shareholders and 
managers and mitigate agency problems between the two parties (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; emsetz, 1983). It is also possible that managers with high 
ownership stakes are less likely to be disciplined and, as a result, are more likely to 
engage in self-interested actions (Holderness and Sheehan, 1991). One way to 
examine the ethical consequences of management ownership is to investigate its 
effect on firm performance or firm value. The extant literature documents that 
management ownership plays a corporate governance role and thus is an important 
determinant of corporate performance (Morck et al., 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1991; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Mehran, 1995; Holderness et al., 1999). Some 
studies find that management ownership has a positive effect on firm performance and 
this is interpreted as evidence of the alignment effect (Mehran, 1995; Holthausen and 
Larcker, 1996; Core and Larcker, 2002). Other studies find that it has a negative 
impact on firm performance and this is considered to be evidence of an entrenchment 
effect (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1991; Lasfer, 2006). However, as there are many determinants of corporate 
performance, it is difficult to establish a direct causal relation between management 
ownership and corporate performance. At the same time, prior studies usually neglect 
the effect of ultimate ownership on the role of managerial ownership. Since different 
ultimate owners have different objectives, managerial appointment mechanisms and 
monitoring powers and wills, management ownership should play different roles.  
This paper aims to examine the ethical consequences of management ownership 
measured by accounting conservatism while taking into account the ownership 
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structure. Compared with corporate performance, accounting conservatism is a more 
direct measure of interest conflicts and alignment between shareholders and managers 
(Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Watts, 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Goh and L i, 
2011). Accounting conservatism helps avoid the firm’s managers receiving large 
bonuses by providing biased upward estimates of future cash flows, which creates 
deadweight losses and reduces firm value. It thus helps reduce the likelihood that 
managers will overstate net assets and cumulative earnings to transfer wealth to 
themselves rather than managing the firm in an optimal manner (Watts, 2003). As a 
consequence, it can facilitate efficient contracting between managers and shareholders 
in the presence of agency problems and help reduce agency costs (Watts, 2003; 
Ahmed and uellman, 2007; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Shuto and Takada, 
2010).  
The co-existence of SOEs and NSOEs makes China an excellent setting for us to 
examine the ethical consequences of management ownership. As will be discussed in 
detail in Section 2.2., controlling shareholders in NSOEs aim to maximize profit 
while those in SOEs have social, political as well as economic objectives which often 
are conflicting. Furthermore, management ownership stakes in NSOEs are usually 
held for a long period, while SOE managers are appointed by the government, and 
their tenure is often shorter than that of their NSOE counterparts. Additionally, 
NSOEs are subject to stringent monitoring by their shareholders, while SOEs face 
weaker monitoring than do NSOEs. These differences between SOEs and NSOEs are 
expected to affect the role of management ownership.  
We find that an increase in management ownership reduces the level of 
accounting conservatism in NSOEs, thus indicating that management ownership has 
an interest alignment effect. In contrast, among SOEs, the impact of management 
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ownership on accounting conservatism is weaker than that in NSOEs and the relation 
between management ownership and accounting conservatism is insignificant.This 
finding shows that management ownership has less of an alignment effect in SOEs 
than in NSOEs.  
Our study makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, the paper to 
our knowledge is the first to use a direct measure to examine the role of management 
ownership and thus it helps improve the reliability of the research findings in this 
literature. Second, this paper is also the first to study the role of management 
ownership from the perspective of ownership structure and finds that management 
ownership has different roles in different types of firms (SOEs and NSOEs). This 
helps enrich the literature on the role of managerial ownership. Finally, while existing 
studies on the role of management ownership are mainly situated in developed 
economies, the findings of this study are important for understanding the role of 
management ownership in developing and emerging economies.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates our 
hypothesis and is followed by an overview of our research design in Section 3. Our 
sample and data are described in Section 4, and Section 5 tests our hypothesis and 
analyzes the results. Section 6 provides further robustness checks. The final section 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
2.1. Management ownership and agency problem 
Traditional agency theory suggests that greater management ownership generates a 
greater alignment of interests between shareholders and managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). This interest alignment effect argument predicts that managers with 
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larger ownership stakes will have stronger incentives to act in line with outside 
shareholders’ interests. This is because managers with high ownership stakes are 
likely to have longer horizons and more human capital tied to the firm. Thus, under 
the interest alignment effect, managers have greater incentives to enhance the value of 
the firm’s shares as management ownership increases. In support of the argument that 
higher managerial equity ownership better aligns the interests of managers and 
shareholders, Mehran (1995) finds that firm performance, as proxied by Tobin’s Q 
and return on assets, is positively related to the percentage of equity held by managers. 
Holthausen and Larcker (1996) and Core and Larcker (2002) also document increases 
in both management ownership and firm performance. 
Management ownership may also have an entrenchment effect, such that 
managers with greater control of the firm have more scope to behave opportunistically 
(Morck et al., 1988). The more shares a manager holds, the less power the other 
owners of the company have to influence the manager’s decisions. This allows 
managers to make specific investments that complement their own skills and 
strengthen their bargaining power, making it difficult to replace them (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989). When the proportion of management ownership increases, managers 
have more voting rights and greater influence enabling them to pursue their own 
interests. Moreover, the larger the proportion, the less likely the company will be 
taken over, and thus the lower the pressure exerted by market control on managers. 
However， most studies in this line examine different ownership levels and produce 
inconsistent results. McConnell and Servaes (1990) examine a large data set and find 
evidence consistent with the management entrenchment argument only when inside 
ownership exceeds 40% of the firm. Lasfer (2006) also finds that high management 
ownership entrenches managers by allowing the CEO to create a board that is unlikely 
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to monitor. Other studies using small samples such as those of Morck et al. (1988) and 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) show that low levels of management ownership 
appear to be associated with managerial entrenchment. Crucially, recent studies find 
no evidence that management ownership is associated with greater entrenchment after 
controlling for the endogeneity between management ownership and the investment 
opportunity set (LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008).Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) find 
that a large increase in management ownership increases Tobin’s Q and there is no 
evidence that a large decrease in management ownership has an adverse impact on 
firm value. Based on a sample of the 460 largest UK  listed companies, Conyon and 
Florou (2002) indicate that there is no evidence of managerial entrenchment at a high 
level of executive ownership. By examining a sample of Chinese firms, Hu and Zhou 
(2008) provide evidence that the interest alignment effect operates in China. Overall, 
evidence supporting the interest alignment effect is stronger than that demonstrating 
the entrenchment effect.  
2.2. The effect of ultimate ownership on the role of management ownership 
The interest alignment effect operates in Chinese NSOEs because management 
ownership in NSOEs is more likely to produce the interest alignment effect which 
reduces agency costs. The most important reason for this intuition is that both 
shareholders and managers care about economic outcomes, the prerequisite for the 
existence of aligned economic interests. As management ownership increases, the 
economic interests of shareholders and managers in NSOEs tend to become more 
closely aligned.  
Furthermore, because management ownership in NSOEs is usually held for a 
long period of time, such firms provide a favorable setting for management ownership 
to realize the interest alignment effect. There are three main types of management 
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ownership in Chinese NSOEs. In the first type, managers are founders or their family 
members in NSOEs which started as small enterprises originally controlled or solely 
owned by the managers (Hu and Zhou, 2008). Among all firms listed on China’s 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Trading Market in 2011, about 40% were family 
firms before their initial public offering (IPO) and 60% had a family member as their 
CEO (X u and Ning, 2011). Such managers have more long-term human capital tied to 
the firm. They tend to be long-term shareholders or to pass their shares on to their 
descendants (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). The second type of management ownership 
is found among managers who obtain their ownership rights in the IPO process. In the 
last two decades, many SOEs have been privatized by issuing shares on the stock 
market (Sun and Tong, 2003) or through control-right transfers (Chen et al., 2008). 
The managers of a firm that was once an SOE could become important shareholders 
when the company was privatized through the sale of some or all of its shares to legal 
persons or individual investors including its managers (Hu and Zhou, 2008). The third 
type of management ownership arises when managers become shareholders through 
restricted share or share option plans if their tenure at the firm has been sufficiently 
long. By the end of 2010, 51 NSOEs had stock or stock option incentive plans, and 
their managers had already held their position for an average of 4.45 years when the 
incentive plan was adopted,
2
 indicating that NSOE ownership by managers has a 
positive relationship with their tenure. Managers can accumulate significant equity 
stakes via these routes, even where they are not part of the founding family. 
Another factor to consider in this context is that NSOEs in China are subject to 
stringent monitoring by their shareholders, which should reduce the entrenchment 
effect that increasing management ownership could bring about. As the equity 
                                                        
2
 The data were manually collected from http://www.cninfo.com.cn/, the information disclosure website 
authorized by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
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ownership of NSOEs is concentrated in founders’ families (e.g., Claessens and Lang, 
2000; Claessens et al., 2002), the agency problem is alleviated by controlling owners’ 
close monitoring. Large shareholders have strong incentives to put pressure on 
managers to run the firm properly because this is likely to increase their wealth 
(Claessens et al., 2002). Evidence from China’s listed firms indicates that ownership 
concentration is associated with a stronger turnover-performance link when the largest 
owner is private (K ato and Long, 2006). As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out, 
large shareholders address the agency problem in such a way that they have both a 
general interest in profit maximization and sufficient control over firm assets to have 
their interests upheld. 
NSOE managers in China are also monitored by the managerial labor market. 
Many NSOE managers who are not founders or their family members come from and 
go back to this market. Their career concerns ensure that they have a keen interest in 
their firm’s performance. For example, CEO turnover in Chinese NSOEs is found to 
be sensitive to stock returns (K ato and Long, 2006). Moreover, NSOEs face 
substantial financial constraints which are one of the most serious barriers to their 
growth. Managerial expropriation from the firm will worsen the firm’s financial 
situation, potentially putting it in a distressed state, resulting in management turnover. 
Market monitoring checks the tendency for increasing management ownership to lead 
to greater managerial expropriation.  
In sum, the common concern for economic objectives among shareholders and 
managers of NSOEs and the long-term nature of management stakes reinforce the 
interest alignment effect of managerial ownership. In addition, monitoring by the 
controlling shareholders of NSOEs and the managerial labor market limits the 
entrenchment effect of managerial ownership. To the extent that these forces combine 
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to produce a net interest alignment effect of management ownership, we expect 
management ownership to have a substitutive effect on accounting conservatism in 
NSOEs. 
The presence of controlling state ownership changes the relative magnitude of 
the interest alignment and entrenchment effects of management ownership for several 
reasons. First, SOEs’ multiple goals reduce the likelihood of management ownership 
aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. uring the transition to a 
market-based economy, maintaining employment levels and providing social security 
to the unemployed are important to maintaining social stability. ue to the lack of 
independent social security institutions and the fact that firms with strong profit 
incentives are not interested in promoting social stability, SOEs in China are required 
to continue to play a role in providing social welfare. Because most SOE managers 
are current or former government bureaucrats, decisions concerning their promotion 
and compensation depend more on adherence to SOEs’ various political and social 
objectives than on the firm’s operating and financial performance (Fan et al., 2007). 
These political and social objectives usually conflict with the firm’s economic 
performance. However, this does not deter SOEs from granting shares to their 
managers; for example, managers could obtain stock options by meeting a very low 
performance threshold which reduces their incentive role and turns them into a form 
of managerial welfare (Lu et al., 2009). This means that increasing management 
ownership is less likely to produce the interest alignment effect in SOEs than in 
NSOEs. 
In addition, the interest alignment effect of management ownership usually 
requires that equity stakes are held over a long horizon. However, the period of 
management ownership in SOEs is usually short. The main reason for this is that most 
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managers are appointed for a short period and their human capital and reputation are 
thus less associated with the firms they serve. SOE managers are often bureaucrats 
and are ultimately appointed by the government, meaning that they frequently change 
jobs between government and SOEs or among SOEs in accordance with government 
assignments. Indeed, their average tenure is only 2.88 years (L iu and L iu, 2007). As a 
result, they do not have strong incentives to hold long term stock positions in the 
firms they serve. Furthermore, their job shifts among companies and between 
government and SOEs allow them to dispose of their stock holdings, because 
although the Company Law stipulates that they cannot transfer more than 25% of 
their shares during their term of office, they can dispose of all their shares six months 
after leaving their job. In other words, while SOE managers must keep most of their 
shares for a short period, they do not have incentives to hold shares for long. The 
result is that management ownership does not have the desired interest alignment 
effect.   
Third, the monitoring of SOEs is often weak because it is more difficult to 
monitor their managers than it is to oversee their private sector counterparts. ue to 
the difficulties in distinguishing between policy-induced losses and 
non-policy-induced losses, managers of SOEs can ascribe all their losses to state 
policies (L in et al., 1998). In addition, the inherent features of SOEs make the 
monitoring of their managers weak. As Chinese SOEs belong to all Chinese citizens, 
government units responsible for the management of state-owned assets are agents 
with little incentive to monitor the behavior of SOE management. Moreover, because 
state and legal person shares of listed Chinese firms held directly or indirectly by the 
government are not tradable,
3
 any transfer of these stocks must be approved by 
                                                        
3
 This has been reformed since 2005 and as a result these shares can be traded publicly once the restrictions agreed 
upon by different types of shareholders are lifted up. 
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numerous government agencies including both the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission and the Ministry of Finance. Hence, the disciplinary effect of market 
takeovers on managers is weakened considerably. Therefore, when ultimate control is 
in the hands of the state, the multiple objectives of SOEs and the short duration of 
their managers’ shareholdings combine to make the interest alignment effect of 
management ownership weaker than in NSOEs. Meanwhile, the entrenchment effect 
of management ownership of SOEs is compounded by weak or non-existent 
monitoring. 
In sum, the nature of ultimate controlling ownership could decrease the 
alignment effect of management ownership and increase the entrenchment effect of 
management ownership. Combined these two effects together, we have the following 
hypothesis: 
Management ownership has less of an alignment effect (or a greater 
entrenchment effect) in SOE s than in NSOE s. 
 
3. R esearch design 
We use accounting conservatism as the direct measure of the interest conflict and 
alignment between management and shareholders. We measure accounting 
conservatism using Basu’s (1997) earnings-return model as follows: 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , ,
*
i t i t i t i t i t i t
NI NEG RET NEG RETb b b b e=     ,              (1) 
where: 
NIi,t= annual income before extraordinary items of firm i in year t, scaled by the 
market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
RETi,t=market-adjusted buy-and-hold annual returns of firm i from May of year 
t to April of year t1; 
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NEGi,t= indicator variable equal to 1 if RETi,tis negative, and 0 otherwise. 
In Equation (1), 
2
b captures the timeliness of earnings with respect to good 
news, and 
3
b  captures asymmetric timeliness with respect to bad news versus good 
news and hence is the measure of conservatism. A positive 
3
b indicates that earnings 
are conservative and there is an alignment between managers and shareholders； the 
higher the value of
3
b ， the higher the alignment. In contrast, a negative 
3
b implies 
optimistic earnings, which means an entrenchment between managers and 
shareholders； the higher the value of 
3
b ， the larger the entrenchment.  
We expand Equation (1) into the following model to test the above hypothesis: 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 , 5 , ,
6 , , 7 , , , 8 , 1 9 , 1 ,
10 , 1 , 11 , 1 , , 12 , , 1
* *
* * * *
* * * * *
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
NI NEG RET NEG RET SOE SOE NEG
SOE RET SOE NEG RET OWN OWN NEG
OWN RET OWN NEG RET SOE OWN
b b b b b b
b b b b
b b b
- -
- - -
=     
   
  
, ,
, , ,
*
* *
i t i t
i t i t i t
NEG RET
CONTROLS CONTROLS NEG CONTROLS RET Year e    
  
(2) 
Where SOE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is an SOE and 0 if it is not 
an SOE. We classify firms into SOEs and NSOEs based on their ultimate controlling 
shareholders. SOEs are defined as firms directly or indirectly owned or controlled by 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission or other state-owned 
enterprises controlled by the central government or local governments. NSOEs are 
defined as firms controlled by private investors.
3
b indicates the level of accounting 
conservatism for NSOEs. 
7
b measures the difference in the level of conservatism 
between SOEs and NSOEs. 
3
b 
7
b
 
indicates the level of accounting conservatism 
for SOEs. OWN is equal to the percentage of shares held by all directors at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. 
11
b measures the relationship between management 
ownership and accounting conservatism in NSOEs, whereas
12
b indicates the 
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difference in the relationship between SOEs and NSOEs. 
11
b 
12
b shows the 
relationship between management ownership and accounting conservatism in SOEs. 
According to our hypothesis， management ownership has less an alignment effect (or 
a greater entrenchment effect) in SOEs than in NSOEs. Thus, we expect 
12
b to be 
significantly positive. 
Following prior studies (e.g., LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008; LaFond and 
Watts, 2008), we control for firm characteristics that are considered to be related to 
accounting conservatism in the Basu’s (1997) model. These variables include firm 
size, leverage and the market-to-book ratio. We measure firm size (Size) by the natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets, firm leverage (Lev) by the book value of 
total debt divided by the book value of total assets, and the market-to-book ratio (MB) 
by the market value of the firm’s assets over the book value of its assets. 
 
4. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
Our initial sample consists of all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges between 2001 and 2009 that are included in the China Securities Markets 
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Our sample period starts from 2001 
because China’s admission to the World Trade Organization triggered a new set of 
accounting rules that took effect in that year. Financial statements data and share price 
data necessary for the study are available from the CSMAR database. We delete banks, 
securities firms and insurance companies because they adopt different accounting 
standards. To ensure the results are not sensitive to extreme values, observations in the 
top and bottom 1% of the sample by annual income (NI) and return (RET) are 
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eliminated.
4
 The selection process yields 10,944 firm-year observations. Panel A of 
Table 1 reports the yearly distribution of sample firms. It can be seen that the annual 
number of observations generally increases over time, rising from 1,006 in 2001 to 
1,441 in 2009.This is consistent with the developing nature of China’s share market. 
The number of SOEs in our sample increases slightly (from 819 to 873) over the 
period, while the number of NSOEs increases considerably (from 187 to 568). This is 
consistent with the pattern of the IPO market in China, where NSOEs went public in 
recent years. Panel B of Table 1 details the distribution of all sample firms across 
various industries. The industry composition of our sample is similar to that of the 
population of firms in the CSMAR database. The most heavily represented industry is 
manufacturing (57.37% of the whole sample). 
Insert Table 1 Here 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for our sample firms. Panel A summarizes 
descriptive statistics on the full sample for the variables used in the regression 
analyses. The average (median) percentage of management ownership (OWN) is 
1.457% (0.003%). The mean (median) NI in our sample is 1.6% (1.7%). The mean 
market-adjusted buy-and-hold annual return of the firm (RET) is -3.8%, while NEG 
has a mean value of 62%. This indicates that 62% of listed Chinese firms have a RET 
lower than the average market return. The median RET of -7.1% is consistent with 
statistics reported in earlier studies (e.g., K ato and Long, 2006). 
Panels B and C of Table 2 report descriptive statistics for SOEs and NSOEs, 
respectively. In these SOEs, the proportion of shares held by board members has a 
mean value of 0.102% and a median value of 0.002%. Although these figures are 
consistent with the results of Wei et al. (2005), they are far lower than the mean 
                                                        
4
 We also winsorize observations in the top and bottom 1% of annual income (NI) and return (RET) observations 
as a robustness check; the results are the same. 
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(4.51%) and median (0.004%) ownership shares held by their NSOE counterparts. 
The mean (median) NI in our sample is 1.7% (1.8%) for SOEs and 1.2% (1.7%) for 
NSOEs.
5
 Note that the left skew of the NSOE NI distribution is consistent with 
accounting conservatism. Panel  of Table 2 reports differences between SOEs and 
NSOEs. Relative to NSOEs, SOEs are larger (SIZE) and more profitable (NI), but 
have lower management ownership (OWN), lower investment opportunity (MB) and 
lower leverage (LEV).  
Insert Table 2 Here 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in estimating our 
models. The upper diagonal of the table reports Pearson correlations, while the lower 
diagonal presents Spearman correlations. The Pearson correlations reveal that NI is 
positively correlated with RET (0.067) and negatively correlated with NEG (–0.135). 
This indicates that reported earnings reflect at least a portion of the information 
reflected in returns, consistent with findings in prior studies (Basu, 1997; Ball et al., 
2000; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008). 
Insert Table 3 Here 
5. E mpirical results 
We estimate Equation (2) using pooled OLS regressions to test our hypothesis. We 
follow LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) by using scaled decile ranks for all 
variables except NI, RET and NEG. To compute the scaled decile ranks, we first rank 
observations by year into 10 groups from 0 to 9, then divide each group value by 9 so 
the rank variable ranges from 0 to 1. 
Table 4 reports the regression results. In Model (1) of Table 4, the coefficient of 
NEG*RET(
3
b ) is 0.018, significant at the 1% level, which indicates that listed 
                                                        
5
 We control for the effect of this ownership difference on our regression results in the section of robustness 
checks. 
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Chinese companies as a whole adopt a conservative accounting approach. The 
coefficient of OWN*NEG*RET(
11
b ) is not significantly different from zero, 
suggesting that there is no significant relationship between management ownership 
and accounting conservatism for all listed companies. This indicates that overall 
management ownership does not have an alignment effect, nor an entrenchment effect. 
When we include the dummy variable for state ownership in Model (2) of Table 4, the 
coefficient of NEG*RET(
3
b ) is still significantly positive, but the coefficient of 
SOE*NEG*RET(
7
b ) is significantly negative, showing accounting conservatism in 
SOEs is weaker than that in NSOEs. The coefficient 
11
b of OWN*NEG*RET is -0.022, 
significant at the 5% level, indicating management ownership is negatively related to 
accounting conservatism in NSOEs， that is, management ownership has played an 
alignment role in NSOEs. The coefficient 
12
b of the interaction term 
SOE*OWN*NEG*RET is 0.023, significant at the 1% level, suggesting that 
management ownership have less of an alignment effect (or a greater entrenchment 
effect) of ownership in SOEs than in NSOEs. However, the coefficient
11
b 
12
b
designed to measure the relation between management ownership and accounting 
conservatism in SOEs is insignificantly different from zero. This shows that SOEs’ 
management ownership does not produce either an alignment effect or an 
entrenchment effect.  
Insert Table 4 Here 
In Model (3) of Table 4, we add the control variables MB, LEV and SIZE to 
control for their potential effects on accounting conservatism. We also add interaction 
terms between these control variables and NEG, RET. The regression results are 
unchanged. 
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Furthermore, we divide the sample into two sub-samples —  one for SOEs and 
the other for NSOEs — and run regressions for them separately. The results for SOEs 
and NSOEs are reported as Models (4) and (5), respectively. The 
11
b  values in the 
two models reveal that although the association between management ownership and 
accounting conservatism is significantly negative in NSOEs, it is insignificant in 
SOEs. These results are consistent with those of Models (2) and (3) and provide 
further support for our hypothesis. 
 
6. R obustness checks 
We have used Basu’s (1997) earnings-return model to measure conservatism in the 
above analysis. Here, we test the robustness of our results to another commonly used 
measure of conditional conservatism that does not rely on share returns: the 
earnings-change model (Basu, 1997; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).
6
 
0 1 , 2 1 3 , 1 ,
*
t i t t i t t i t
NI NEG NI NEG NIb b b b e
- -
 =                       (3) 
where: 
ΔNI = change in annual income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to t 
scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1; 
NEG=an indicator variable equal to 1 if ΔNI is negative, and 0 otherwise;  
Specifically, similar to Equation (2), we extend the basic earnings-change model 
as follows: 
0 1 , 2 1 3 , 1 4 , 5 , ,
6 , 1 7 , , 1 8 , 1 9 , 1 ,
10 , 1 1 11 , 1 , 1 12 , , 1
* *
* * * *
* * * * *
t i t t i t t i t i t i t
i t t i t i t t i t i t i t
i t t i t i t t i t i t
NI NEG NI NEG NI SOE SOE NEG
SOE NI SOE NEG NI OWN OWN NEG
OWN NI OWN NEG NI SOE OWN N
b b b b b b
b b b b
b b b
- -
- - - -
- - - - -
 =       
     
    
, 1
, 1 ,
*
* *
i t t
i t t i t
EG NI
CONTROLS CONTROLS NEG CONTROLS NI Year e
-
-

     
    (4) 
Where SOE, OWN and the control variables are defined in the same manner as in 
                                                        
6
 Other studies that use this model include those of Nichols et al. (2008), Chung and Wynn (2008), and Goh and 
L i (2011). 
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Equation (2). 
Basu (1997) shows that conservatism results in lower earnings persistence in bad 
news periods than it does in good news periods. In Equation (4), the coefficient on 
NEG*Δ NI is consistent with timely loss recognition, so
3
b should be negative. 
Because
11
b  measures the relation between management ownership and conservatism 
in NSOEs, 
11
0b   indicates that NSOEs’ management ownership has an alignment 
effect. 
12
b uses NSOEs as the reference group to measure the incremental effect of 
management ownership in SOEs. Table 5 reports the results of estimating Equation 
(4). In Model (2) of Table 5, which includes the control variables MB, LEV and SIZE, 
the coefficient 
11
b is 0.464, significant at the 1% level, the coefficient 
12
b is -0.289, 
significant at the 5% level, and
11
b 
12
b  is insignificantly different from zero. These 
results also provide evidence in support of our hypothesis. Model (3) in Table 5, 
which also includes the interaction terms between the control variables and NEG, 
1t
NI
-
 , generates results similar to those derived from Model (2). When we run 
separate regressions for the SOE and NSOE subsamples as shown in Models (4) and 
(5), we obtain results similar to those reported in Table 4.  
Insert Table 5 Here 
Table 2 shows that the level of management ownership in SOEs is significantly 
lower than that in NSOEs. To control for the effect of this ownership difference on our 
findings, we rerun Equation (2) using a matching sample. We start with NSOEs with 
management ownership and then find matching SOEs with the closest level of 
management ownership in the same industry and same year. This process generates a 
sample of 3,104 observations, half SOEs and half NSOEs. The resultant level of 
management ownership is not significantly different between the two subsamples. We 
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re-run Model (1) using the matching sample and the results are unchanged.  
The foregoing analysis is based on the sample formed by removing observations 
in the top and bottom 1% for annual income (NI) and return (RET). The results do not 
change when we winsorizethe observations in the top and bottom 1% for annual 
income (NI) and return (RET) as an alternative. We have followed LaFond and 
Roychowdhury (2008) by using scaled decile ranks for management ownership in the 
above analysis. Our results are robust to the use of the raw proportion of management 
ownership. 
The investment opportunity set (IOS) is a common factor that affects both 
management ownership and the accounting conservatism. Himmelberg et al. (1999) 
model enables us to decompose total management ownership into a predicted 
component conditional on explanatory variables that primarily proxy for the firm’s 
IOS, and an unexpected component (UNEXP_OWN). Our results are robust to 
controlling for the IOS. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined how corporate ownership affects the ethical 
consequences of management ownership using accounting conservatism as the direct 
measure of entrenchment and alignment between shareholders and managers. Our 
results show that in NSOEs, management ownership has an alignment effect. In 
contrast, it has less of an alignment effect in SOEs than in NSOEs; in actuality, SOEs’ 
management ownership does not produce either an alignment effect or entrenchment 
effect. These results indicate that the governance role of management ownership is 
moderated by the nature of ultimate controlling ownership. An important policy 
implication of our findings is that management ownership is an effective governance 
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mechanism in NSOEs, but not so in SOEs. The main reason is that the differences in 
ownership nature mean that the two types of firms have different objectives.  
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Table 1 
Sample istribution 
Panel A : istribution by year 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total  
Total 1,006 1,072 1,130 1,192 1,270 1,222 1,268 1,343 1,441 10,944 
SOEs 819 830 839 845 888 820 818 848 873 7,580 
NSOEs 187 242 291 347 382 402 450 495 568 3,364 
Panel B: istribution by industry 
 No. of firm-years % of Sample 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 243 2.22 
Mining 170 1.56 
Manufacturing 6,279 57.37 
Utilities 473 4.32 
Construction 222 2.03 
Transportation 456 4.17 
Information and technology 658 6.01 
Wholesale trade 722 6.60 
Real estate 499 4.56 
Services 343 3.13 
Entertainment 82 0.75 
Conglomerates 797 7.28 
Total 10,944 100.00 
Notes 
SOEs are defined as those firms directly or indirectly owned or controlled by State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission or other state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government or local 
governments. NSOEs are defined as those firms controlled by private investors. 
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Table 2 
escriptive statistics 
 Mean Median Standard 
eviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Panel A : Full sample (n=10,944) 
OWN% 1.457 0.003 7.507 0.000 74.805 
NI 0.016 0.017 0.062 -1.122 0.375 
RET -0.038 -0.071 0.533 -2.198 5.173 
NEG 0.620 1.000 0.485 0.000 1.000 
MB 1.475 1.241 0.856 0.176 33.083 
LEV 0.507 0.485 0.404 0.008 16.329 
SIZE 21.215 21.105 1.051 16.831 27.809 
Panel B: SOE  sample (n=7,580) 
OWN% 0.102 0.002 0.011 0.000 31.792 
NI 0.017 0.018 0.057 -0.721 0.374 
RET -0.043 -0.068 0.519 -2.198 5.173 
NEG 0.620 1.000 0.485 0.000 1.000 
MB 1.416 1.223 0.656 0.176 12.382 
LEV 0.489 0.482 0.281 0.008 8.502 
SIZE 21.384 21.245 1.062 17.318 27.809 
Panel C : NSOE  sample (n=3,364) 
OWN% 4.510 0.004 12.938 0.000 74.805 
NI 0.012 0.017 0.071 -1.122 0.364 
RET -0.029 -0.078 0.565 -2.174 4.734 
NEG 0.620 1.000 0.485 0.000 1.000 
MB 1.608 1.288 1.179 0.477 33.083 
LEV 0.546 0.496 0.592 0.009 16.329 
SIZE 20.836 20.802 0.916 16.831 24.757 
Panel : ifference between SOE  and NSOE  samples 
 Mean diff T-test Median diff Wilcoxon
sign rank test
OWN% - 4.408 - 19.73*** - 0.002 9.841*** 
NI 0.005 3.97***  0.001 -2.606*** 
RET - 0.015 - 1.28  0.010 -1.134 
NEG 0.000 0.02  0.000 -0.022 
MB - 0.192 - 8.86*** - 0.065 9.488*** 
LEV - 0.056 - 5.26*** - 0.014 2.685*** 
SIZE 0.547 27.42*** 0.443 -24.733*** 
Notes 
OWN is the percentage of management ownership to total equity shares. NI is annual income before extraordinary 
items scaled by beginning of fiscal year market value of equity. RET is market-adjusted buy-and-hold annual 
returns from May of year t to April of year t1; NEG is an indicator variable equal to 1 if RET is negative, and 0 
otherwise. MB is the market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year; LEV is equal to total debt divided by 
total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year; SIZE is equal to natural log of total assets at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. SOEs are defined as those firms directly or indirectly owned or controlled by State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission or other state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government 
or local governments. NSOEs are defined as those firms controlled by private investors. 
***: Significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 3 
Correlation matrix 
 OWN SOE NI RET NEG MB LEV SIZE 
OWN  -0.271*** 0.036*** 0.006 -0.032*** 0.030*** -0.060*** -0.100*** 
SOE -0.094***  0.041*** -0.013 0.001 -0.104*** -0.064*** 0.240*** 
NI 0.013 0.025***  0.067*** -0.135*** -0.068*** -0.093*** 0.198*** 
RET 0.051*** 0.011 0.136***  -0.593*** -0.016* 0.024*** -0.050*** 
NEG -0.025** 0.001 -0.187*** -0.841***  0.025*** 0.011 0.009 
MB 0.073*** -0.091*** -0.310*** 0.034*** 0.030***  0.192*** -0.332*** 
LEV -0.062*** -0.026*** -0.056*** -0.033** 0.016* -0.219***  -0.057*** 
SIZE 0.024*** 0.236*** 0.317*** -0.036** -0.006*** -0.442*** 0.205***  
Notes 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations are at the upper (lower) diagonal. OWN is the percentage of shares held by all 
directors at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is an SOE and 0 if it 
is an NSOE. NI is annual income before extraordinary items scaled by beginning of fiscal year market value of 
equity. RET is market-adjusted buy-and-hold annual returns from May of year t to April of year t1; NEG is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise. MB is the market-to-book ratio at the beginning 
of the fiscal year; LEV is equal to total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year; SIZE is equal 
to the natural log of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
***: Significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level.
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Table 4 
R egression results using the earnings-return model 
 Expected 
Sign 
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample SOEs  NSOEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept (
0
b ) 
 0.031*** 
(10.57) 
0.029*** 
(8.88) 
0.029*** 
(6.38) 
0.026*** 
(5.47) 
0.037***
(4.38) 
NEG(
1
b ) 
 -0.016*** 
(-7.81) 
-0.012*** 
(-3.76) 
-0.010* 
(-1.72) 
-0.011* 
(-1.78) 
-0.019*
(-1.65) 
RET(
2
b ) 
 -0.006*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.003 
(-0.97) 
-0.010* 
(-1.79) 
-0.006 
(-1.20) 
-0.027*** 
(-2.60) 
NEG*RET(
3
b ) 
 0.018*** 
(4.13) 
0.034*** 
(5.03) 
0.036*** 
(5.19) 
0.018*** 
(3.39) 
0.034*** 
(3.45) 
SOE(
4
b ) 
  0.002 
(0.78) 
0.001 
(0.45) 
  
SOE*NEG(
5
b ) 
  -0.005 
(-1.52) 
-0.004 
(-1.14) 
  
SOE*RET(
6
b ) 
  -0.005 
(-1.45) 
-0.003 
(-0.89) 
  
SOE*NEG*RET(
7
b ) 
-  -0.020*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.020*** 
(-2.92) 
  
OWN(
8
b ) 
 0.003 
(0.87) 
0.003 
(0.94) 
0.003 
(1.01) 
-0.001 
(-0.20) 
0.005 
(0.92) 
OWN*NEG(
9
b ) 
 -0.002 
(-0.55) 
-0.003 
(-0.79) 
-0.004 
(-0.89) 
0.002 
(0.34) 
-0.009 
(-1.18) 
OWN*RET(
10
b ) 
 0.007 
(1.55) 
0.007 
(1.42) 
0.009* 
(1.85) 
0.006 
(1.05) 
0.017** 
(2.07) 
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OWN*NEG*RET(
11
b ) 
- -0.005 
(-0.61) 
-0.022** 
(-2.42) 
-0.023*** 
(-2.57) 
0.004 
(0.44) 
-0.034*** 
(-2.59) 
SOE*OWN*NEG*RET(
12
b ) 
  0.023*** 
(2.57) 
0.023** 
(2.50) 
  
CONTROLS  Included Included Included Included Included 
CONTROLS*NEG    Included Included Included 
CONTROLS*RET    Included Included Included 
Year effect  Included Included Included Included Included 
Test: 
3 7
0b b =  
  P-value=0.00 P-value=0.00   
Test: 
11 12
0b b =  
  P-value=0.86 P-value=0.94   
Adj. R
2
  0.117 0.118 0.120 0.127 0.110 
F-value  81.45 64.76 52.65 46.90 18.42 
Obs.  10,944 10,944 10,944 7,580 3,364 
Notes 
The dependent variable is NI. NI is annual income before extraordinary items scaled by beginning of fiscal year market value of equity. OWN is equal to the scaled decile rank of percentage of 
shares held by all directors at the beginning of the fiscal year; RET is market-adjusted buy-and-hold annual returns from May of year t to April of year t1; NEG is an indicator variable equal to 
1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise; SOE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is an SOE and 0 if it is an NSOE. CONTROLS include: MB, measured by the scaled decile rank of the 
market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year; LEV, measured by the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year; SIZE, measured by the 
scaled decile rank of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
In parentheses are t-statistics. ***: Significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5 
R egression results based on the earnings-change model 
 Expected 
Sign 
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample SOEs  NSOEs
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept (
0
b ) 
 -0.003 
(-0.71) 
-0.002 
(-0.43) 
-0.004 
(-0.87) 
-0.008 
(-1.48) 
-0.004 
(-0.43) 
NEG(
1
b ) 
 -0.017*** 
(-5.05) 
-0.019*** 
(-4.43) 
-0.011 
(-1.56) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
-0.017 
(-1.33) 
1t
NI
-
 (
2
b ) 
 0.072*** 
(2.61) 
0.078** 
(2.36) 
0.041 
(0.71) 
0.007 
(0.09) 
0.092 
(1.00) 
, 1
*
i t t
NEG NI
-
 (
3
b ) 
- -0.752*** 
(-14.34) 
-0.834*** 
(-11.39) 
-0.827*** 
(-11.27) 
-0.613*** 
(-9.59) 
-0.947*** 
(-9.85) 
SOE(
4
b ) 
  -0.001 
(-0.23) 
-0.002 
(-0.76) 
  
SOE*NEG(
5
b ) 
  0.003 
(0.81) 
0.005 
(1.48) 
  
SOE*
1t
NI
-
 (
6
b ) 
  -0.011 
(-0.37) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
  
SOE*NEG*
1t
NI
-
 (
7
b ) 
  0.133* 
(1.66) 
0.132* 
(1.64) 
  
OWN(
8
b ) 
 0.005 
(1.45) 
0.005 
(1.41) 
0.004 
(1.12) 
-0.002 
(-0.53) 
0.015** 
(2.12) 
OWN*NEG(
9
b ) 
 -0.002 
(-0.36) 
-0.002 
(-0.29) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
OWN*
1t
NI
-
 (
10
b ) 
 -0.154*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.155*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.146*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.031 
(-0.43) 
-0.287*** 
(-3.17) 
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OWN*NEG*
1t
NI
-
 (
11
b ) 
 0.284*** 
(2.97) 
0.464*** 
(3.77) 
0.463*** 
(3.76) 
-0.034 
(-0.29) 
0.753*** 
(4.47) 
SOE*OWN*NEG*
1t
NI
-
 (
12
b ) 
-  -0.289** 
(-2.29) 
-0.287** 
（ -2.28）  
  
CONTROLS  Included Included Included Included Included 
CONTROLS*NEG    Included Included Included 
CONTROLS*
1t
NI
-
  
   Included Included Included 
Year effect  Included Included Included Included Included 
Test: 
3 7
0b b =  
  P-value=0.00 P-value=0.00   
Test: 
11 12
0b b =  
  P-value=0.11 P-value=0.10   
Adj. R
2
  0.109 0.109 0.111 0.109 0.121 
F-value  73.63 57.98 46.72 39.05 19.38 
Obs.  10,639 10,639 10,639 7,445 3,194 
Notes 
The dependent variable is ΔNI. ΔNI measures change in annual income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to t scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1; OWN is equal to the scaled decile 
rank of percentage of shares held by all directors at the beginning of the fiscal year; NEG is an indicator variable equal to 1 if ΔNI is negative, and 0 otherwise; SOE is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the firm is an SOE and 0 if it is an NSOE. CONTROLS include: MB, measured by the scaled decile rank of the market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year; LEV, measured 
by the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year; SIZE, measured by the scaled decile rank of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
In parentheses are t-statistics.***: Significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level. 
